Sunday, August 9, 2009

Particularism

An internalist about knowledge is someone who believes that when a person S has knowledge, then S has cognitive access to the basis of knowledge and why it is a good basis. This basis will be a reason, or experience or some other piece of knowledge. According to the internalist S's belief b is knowledge iff:

1. the belief p has feature q
2. beliefs with the feature q are usually true
3. S is aware of 1 and 2

However, 3 is also something that must be known, so it too must meet these requirements. That will lead to an infinite regress because to know something S will have to know something else. The problem with this method is that it seeks to begin the search for knowledge using some criteria, but any croteria will always be more doubtful than our most strongly held beliefs.

Therefore one should adopt a particularist method: taking those beliefs that seem to oneself to be good candidates for being knowledge and noting in what circumstances they do and do not seem reasonable. No doubt there will be disagreement, so it is important to understand that these examples are revisable. One can then make inferences based on the examples and check for consistency. Using conclusions and reflections to revise the examples, and come up with some working criteria of knowledge.

It is obvious from the history of philosophy that there has been much more agreement over items of knowledge such as basic empirical beliefs, belief in the past, in other minds, mathematical beliefs, and to a lesser extent ethical beliefs. Criteria for knowledge on the other hand have been much more varied, and rarely seem acceptable without persuasive argument. For this reason we should continue gathering examples of knowledge in the hope that it will lead us to a better understanding of the correct criteria.

3 comments:

Karl said...

Should one's personal belief in a god be a "good candidate" for basic knowledge and what inference from examples could show consistency in this case?

Karl said...

I posted this on commonsenseatheism.com and wanted you to be aware:
ildi: Duh, it’s called the scientific method! I can’t believe no one in this thread brought this up?
I share your desire to have a scientific or evidential approach to epistemology, but then Kyle goes into the subject of how to determine foundational/basic beliefs (which underly even science). In other words, what is "properly basic?" At some level, even the hardcore skeptic has to posit criteria by which we can justify something as "properly basic" without slipping into radical skepticism or solipsism. Classical foundationalism (CF), which I think makes the most sense so far, seeks to end the possible infinite regress of justifying beliefs by defining properly basic beliefs as those beliefs that are (i) self-evident, or (ii) incorrigible, otherwise something can be believed inferentially on an evidential basis. An example of self-evident beliefs are axioms of logic/math. Obviously the list of "properly basic" belief should be VERY low (and we shouldn't let much slip into this category). Plantiga rejects CF and posits his reformed epistemology (he's presented it in two main ways over the years), but I think he's wrong. Here's a great explanation of why Plantiga is not convincing: http://tiny.cc/oYUWt
Regarding the new posts that Kyle mentions, he only outlines assertions of alternative epistemological methods (ie. particularism), but DOES NOT explain why they are correct or how they are used to justify his particular beliefs. His outline of particularism ends very vaguely also and just states that there is significant disagreement so we should continue to refine a working criteria of knowledge. Ok, yeah...of course we should discuss this....so I would ask "what are the criteria of knowledge used by Kyle." I still haven't seen him provide reasoning for his brand of particularism (even within the criteria for particularism) or address the counterarguments to such a view.
I think also that a liberalizing of "proper basicality" from CF to something like particularism or reformed epistemology, as Plantiga has done in the latter, requires the person holding that liberalized epistemic position to given reasons why...I haven't seen any good reasons yet.

Kyle said...

Sorry for the delay in replying. I went on holiday, and came back to discover that my internet connection wasn't working.

I agree with you that I have not answered lots of questions. That will take time, and I hope to work towards rectifying that through things said in this blog.

"Obviously the list of "properly basic" belief should be VERY low (and we shouldn't let much slip into this category)."

I'm not sure why you think this is obvious. You might be right that its a good idea to keep the list short, but I don't see why its obvious.

"what are the criteria of knowledge used by Kyle."

That is a bit irrelevant to this discussion. I'm trying to argue that one does not need to first set out criteria. I believe there are criteria, and probably something like Plantinga's proper functionalism, but I do not think anyone needs to set out criteria (or even be implicitly aware of any criteria) to be able to claim to know things.