Foundational Beliefs

Sorry for disappearing for so long. I've had exams, and dissertation keeping me busy.

Anthony Kenny makes an interesting observation in Faith and Reason. He points out that his belief that Australia exists is held with more certainty than anything he can bring forward as evidence for that belief. For example, if asked to justify his belief he might point to the fact that it appears in atlases, that he has bought wine from Australia, that he has seen animals from Australia at the zoo, and he knows people who live there.

However, suppose he found an atlas that contained no Australia - it just had an expanse of water. Would he count this as disconfirming his belief that Australia existed? Surely not, one would simply conclude that the atlas was faulty. Or perhaps Kenny might discover that the wine he had drunk was not really from Australia. It all comes from Austria but due to a typo it now says Australia, and Austrian vineyards decided not to change it as part of a joke. One could go on suggesting ways in which the evidence may be misleading, but in none of these situations would it be rational for Kenny to abandon his belief that Australia exists.

It is clear that this has not always been the case. An eighteenth century European would have based their belief in Australia upon various pieces of evidence and the testimony of others, in such a way that undermining the evidence would give them a rational obligation to give up their belief in Australia.

What then should we conclude? Is Kenny's belief in Australia irrational because it is held more firmly than the evidence he has? That would seem to be an overly sceptical conclusion.

The response favoured by Kenny is that those beliefs that are common to all sane adults in ones society form a set of foundational beliefs, that, although not beyond epistemic appraisal, are not in need to rational support, and require compelling evidence if they are to be rejected.

There seems to be something compelling about this. It does not place too great a burden upon one to have evidence for everything one believes. However, I am concerned that it provides too much protection for deeply ingrained cultural beliefs. It is also not clear why one should stop at only those beliefs that are common to all sane adults. Perhaps the set of reasonable foundational beliefs varies not simply between cultures, but between believers.